THE MOVEMENT OF THOUGHT IN EGYPT UNDER THE MIDDLE KINGDOM AND THE EMPIRE AND IN CHINA FROM THE HAN DYNASTY TO THE MING DYNASTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to present a comparative analysis of the development of thought in Egypt from the Middle Kingdom to the Empire, and in China from the Han to the Ming Dynasties. An attempt will also be made to show how in the two societies man made the transition from an age of customary morality to one of philosophy. This transition is an acknowledged fact, although I have stopped to consider just how the transition was made in China and Egypt or to discover the similarities and dissimilarities in the experiences of these two societies

For the purpose of this study, let us regard the philosophical age as the result of a developmental process. The discussion that follows, however, is not a de Morgan-Bachofen view of immutable evolutionary stages. But, even the de Morgan-Bachofen view recognizes that religion cannot be separated from a discussion of man. In all its stages and manifestations it has been inextricably linked with the mind and personality of man. Religion and its observances, rituals, beliefs and ceremonies are all the products of man's mind, and the expression of his personality. In turn, the history of human societies seems to indicate that the development of religion has been a necessary base or antecedent to the development of philosophy in these societies.

The earliest periods of human life were perhaps characterized by a lack of religion of any form. Life during these per-

iods was at best a struggle. Fulfillment of the basic biological needs was of prime importance. There was little or no language and self-preservation was the dominant drive.

When the powers of thought and action matured and man had more time to observe and consider his environment, he became more aware of the differences between himself and the world about him. He began to wonder about the causes which lay behind the effects which he could observe. He began to express himself more freely and eventually to use his subjective expressions in an attempt to explain natural phenomena. He accumulated a large store of beliefs about his environment and it is in these beliefs that we find the seeds of primitive religion. Religion in this stage embodied a group of customs which governed the life of the individual. Conformity was the rule. Custom was of first importance and the interests of the individual were subordinated to tribal customs which extended to all aspects of life.

At the next stage we find that religion had lost some of its primitive characteristics and had produced philosophical thinking. Consciously or unconsciously, man began to reexamine the body of beliefs which were at the basis of his religion. He then selected those aspects of his beliefs which appeared to him most valid in the light of his accumulated experience, and developed this selection into a more or less systematized collection of ideas. In other words, man was becoming theological. he had formulated an ideal and was working toward its realization.

Thus, each new stage in the development of religion came as the result of a broader outlook and of needs which came as a consequence of this extension of outlook.

It is clear that there can be drawn from this analysis of the development of thought in Egypt and China no conclusions that will apply equally to other societies. But, it is believed that the larger aspects of the analysis will apply rather broadly to any society.

No attempt is made to discuss political events, per se, although it has been almost impossible to avoid giving some consideration to political developments if only to serve as guideposts in the history of the development of thought in a society.

CHAPTER I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS

Egypt occupied throughout the "First Intermediate Period" a semi-isolated geographical position in respect to its proximity to other civilizations, and experienced a major breakdown in its civilization. The "First Intermediate Period" is characterized by a disintegrated central political structure and a languishing culture.[1]

During and after the Middle Kingdom which followed the "First Intermediate Period" Egyptian society revived. Following the Middle Kingdom we see a fundamental development beginning to take place in the thought of the Egyptians. From the Twelfth Dynasty through the Empire the development in Egyptian thought was inextricably bound to and dependent on that general emancipation experienced by Egypt, as its political institutions, social organization, and economic structure underwent change.

The Egyptian philosophy of the cosmos, the state, and the place of humanity within both can be best grasped by understand-

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[1]The discussion which follows above is based largely on Alexandre Moret, The Nile and Egyptian Civilization (New York, 1927); A. Moret and G. Davy, From Tribe to Empire (New York, 1926); E. Drioton and J. Vandier, Les peuples de l'orient Méditerranéen (Paris, 1938); J. H. Breasted, A History of Egypt (New York, 1905); idem, Dawn of Conscience (New York, 1933), Henri Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods (Chicago, 1952); idem, Ancient Egyptian Religion (New York, 1948); and John A. Wilson, The Burden of Egypt (Chicago, 1951).

ing religion, which was closely bound up with the political system. Egyptian thought from the Middle Kingdom to the Empire, though closely associated with active political developments, did not undergo any sudden or drastic change, but was constantly being revised and manifested a definite tendency towards sophistication. To delineate the subtlety of this revision it is best that our discussion begin with the original ideas of these people. We shall notice that, as the Egyptians attained greater control over natural forces, his explanation of them became more systematic and critical, and altered his conception of the state and the celestial world.

Egyptologists usually believe that the Egyptians were polytheistic in thought, for their religion embraced a multitude of deities. One may insist, however, that the Egyptians were monophysite since they clearly show in their writings that their gods were of a single nature and that this nature was epitomized in the sun god. At an early stage of their development they attributed human form to this god, but, even then, he and his subordinate gods were operative largely in the heavenly sphere. The gods were, however, embodiments of an idea which necessitated earthly application. Thus, they were represented on earth in the human form of their relative, the son of the creator god, the Pharaoh.

The fundamental beliefs held by the Egyptians, as expressed in their writings, appear always the same. They looked forward to the resurrection and immortality and, hence, all of their writings reflected that one idea.

> In spite of all the popular developments of religious magic . . . the essentials of the indigenous religion of the country remained unchanged from the time of the early dynasties to the end of the Graeco-Roman Period.[1]

During the period of the Old Kingdom, Egyptians regarded the celestial world as a replica of their own world. The Pharaoh was supposed to be the actual link between the two worlds because he was related to the gods. He was thought to be a divine, omniscient arbiter of all affairs affecting the state and its people. Since most--perhaps all--of his subjects considered him of divine origin all power and the very existence of the state were inherent in the divinity of the Pharaoh's person. His divine birth afforded him mystical powers to perform his duties of state. He sat in his capital at Memphis as the ultimate source of authority and adjudicated all cases in which there were miscarriages of justice, paid homage to his family, the greater gods, and sanctioned all laws.

Edgerton believes that all legislative functions were discharged by the Pharaoh.[2] Certainly among the ancient Egyptians all legislative utterance by the Pharaoh was accepted as magical. The fact that his utterances finally reached the person charged with executing the command, no matter where that agent might be in the kingdom, contributed to the magical aura which surrounded the Pharaoh. The Pharaoh was a virtual autocrat, but, even so,

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[1]E. A. Wallis Budge, Osiris and the Egyptian Resurrection (London, n. d.), I, x.

[2]W. F. Edgerton, "Feudal or Similar Institutions in Ancient Egypt" (Private circulation by the American Council of Learned Societies, 1950), p. 1.

he did not govern without consideration for the welfare of the people. He was thought to be obligated to the greater gods of the celestial world to ". . . respect the tradition and privileges of classes and regions" in so far as he approved their fairness; but in principle there was no "autonomous justice or law outside the crown."[1] Frankfort rightly observes that the power of the Pharaoh over his subjects " was experienced not as a tyranny reluctantly endured but as a relationship which established for each subject his function and place in the world."[2]

We should be mindful of the fact that the Pharaoh's powers do not appear to have rested on force, but on the conviction of the populace that the state and a population with class distinctions had been fashioned by the gods and ought therefore to exist. Furthermore, to most Egyptians the world order was fixed and stable, conforming largely to the celestial world of the gods. Consequently they were not friendly to any attempts to change it. It is quite possible that the Egyptians had more definite ideas than these, but we do not know what they were. We are fairly certain, however, that they were eager to maintain amicable relations with the gods that divine protection might be enlisted in times of danger and divine blessings gained after death in everlasting life.

Yet, that every Egyptian hoped for immortality during the

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[1]Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods, p. 51.

[2]Ibid., p. 53.

Old Kingdom is highly problematical. The general opinion of scholars is that only the Pharaoh was thought to achieve survival, but in a strange manner which included somehow a part or perhaps all of his subjects.[1] The life, therefore, of Egyptians chosen for the celestial world was thought to be inextricably bound to and dependent on that of the Pharaoh. Consequently, it is very possible that the Egyptians believed that an attempt to change the world social order and depose the Pharaoh would bring the disfavor of the gods and jeopardize a pleasant life in this world and the next.

The efficacy among the people of the myth that the Pharaoh was a god who had power over the celestial forces rested on the literature and rituals perfected by the priests. There was no single body of priests to administer the religious ceremonies throughout Egypt. Egypt was composed administratively of about forty nomes and each had its own priesthood though there was little variation in their temple organization. Priests were responsible to the Nomarch in whose area their temple was located. The Pharaoh himself was not confined to or associated with any particular order of priests. He, by virtue of the fact that he was the son of the gods, could officiate before any nome god.

The Memphite Theology of the Old Kingdom shows clearly that Egyptian thought was speculative and sought to give an adequate explanation of the physical world. More particularly, the Egyptian was concerned with the process and purpose of creation. In

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[1]Cf. Drioton and Vandier, op. cit., p. 92; Moret, The Nile and Egyptian Civilization, p. 332.

the Memphite Theology Ptah was proclaimed "the earth god" and "the primary source of existence":[1]

> He [Ptah] created the local gods, he made the cities, he founded the provincial divisions; he put the gods in their places of worship, he fixed their offerings, he founded their chapels. He made their bodies (statues) resemble that which pleased their hearts (that is, the form in which they desired to be manifested). And so the gods entered into their bodies of every kind of wood, of every kind of stone, of every kind of clay, of every kind of thing which grows upon him, in which they have taken form.[2]

According to Wilson, this "idea of a rational principle behind creation constitutes the Egyptian's closest approach to the Logos doctrine--'in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.'"[3] It is significant that, in their attempt to discover first principles to explain the universe, the Egyptians were engaged in a form of abstract thinking. They were seeking rather pragmatically an understanding of the cosmos and the place of humanity within it.

> But we must remember that the Memphite Theology lies two thousand years before the Greeks or Hebrews. The insistence that there was a creative and controlling intelligence, which fashioned the phenomena of nature and which provided, from the beginning, rule and rationale, was a high peak of pre-Greek thinking, a peak which was not surpassed in later Egyptian history. From that achievement it may be argued that ancient Egypt exhibited its best at the beginning of its history, in the first three or four dynasties, when its culture was still tentative and exploratory, in search of national expression. Later, when it had discovered the satisfactory forms of expression, speculation about purposes

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[1] Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion, p. 23.

[2] Ibid., p. 24.

[3] Op. cit., p. 59.

> and goals fell under a kind of tacit interdict, and the world and heavenly order had to be accepted as given, as belonging to the realm of divine myth and therefore not to be examined or questioned by mere man.[1]

This tacit interdict which Wilson believes defined the scope of Egyptian thought will be explained when we compare the Memphite Theology with the Amarna Theology of Ikhnaton.[2]

The views outlined above were generally held by Egyptians at the beginning of the "First Intermediate Period." When the political fabric of the Old Kingdom broke up following the Sixth Dynasty, particularism became the order of the day. Nomarchs began to appear as virtual Pharaohs in their areas. The heavenly society which had been conceived by Egyptians as a replica of the larger society was demagnified to such an extent that it conformed largely to that of the earthly nome. The position of Re, who had been conceived as creator god and chief priest of all gods in the Old Kingdom, was usurped by the patron deity of the nome. The decadence of Egyptian high culture in the "First Intermediate Period" did not destroy the fundamental Egyptian code of morality, belief in immortality, or belief in the existence of a benevolent, omniscient being. Although Egypt was not unified, this did not seriously affect the course of Egyptian thought. The priests of the various nomes were developing a systematic, coherent theology out of fundamental Egyptian beliefs and were attaching these beliefs to the deity of their

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[1] Ibid., p. 60.

[2] Cf. p. 28.

particular nome. At the same time these beliefs were apparently being purified by the various priesthoods. Although Egyptians are usually considered polytheistic in religion,[1] it would seem that their religious beliefs were steadily approaching a juncture where they thought one god was what actually existed. Budge points out that the Egyptians always believed in the supremacy of one god and that their whole theological system was based on that belief.[2] He states further that:

> When we examine the "gods" [of the Egyptians] closely, they are found to be nothing more or less than forms, or manifestations, or phases, or attributes, of one god, that god being Ra the Sun god, who, it must be remembered, was the type and symbol of God.[3]

The process through which, at different times, Osiris, Isis, Amon, Atum, Chepre, Khnum, Horus, Min, Mentu, Sebek, Ptah, and Thoth each appeared to the Egyptians as a universal god identified with and perhaps equal to Re illustrates the syncretistic nature of Egyptian beliefs. The emergence of Amon as Re, "creator god and king of all other gods," and as Osiris, "god of eternity and everlastingness," cannot be due solely to the fact that the Pharaohs of the Twelfth Dynasty unified Egypt. Nor can it be due to the additional consequence that Amon became the official god of Egypt only because he was their patron deity.[4]

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[1]Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion, p. 22.

[2]E. A. Wallis Budge, Egyptian Ideas of the Future Life (3rd ed.; London, 1908), pp. 1-2.

[3]Ibid., p. 131.

[4]Adolf Erman, A Handbook of Egyptian Religion (London, 1904); Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods, pp. 160-161.

> This [the substitution of Amon-Re for Re] is usually considered a mere trick of priestly syncretism intended to add glamour to the god of the capital Thebes. In reality, it was truly creative thought which realized the potentialities of a combination of the concept of the creator-sun with that of Amon, the "breath of life," "the hidden one," who, as one of the Eight of Hermopolis, was part of uncreated chaos.
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> . . . Amon could be viewed as the First Cause, especially since, as breath, unseen, he could be apprehended as the basis of life. Hence the phrase: "Amon, the venerable god who came into being which one lives forever." The same thought is expressed in the Luxor temple in a design in which Amon holds the sign of life toward King Amenophis III with the words: "My beloved son, receive my likeness in thy nose."
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> Thus the god [Amon] who had been the invisible dynamic element of Chaos, the wind, became the source of light and order and power, not unlike the Hebrew ruah elohim, the "breath of God," which "moved upon the face of the waters." As has been said, Amon is not only deus invisibilis but deus ineffabilis. He is also the god to whom the poor can pray: "Thou art Amon, the lord of him who is silent, who cometh at the voice of the humble man." Amon, then, was a universal god. . . .[1]

This god had been most vividly displayed in the quasi-human form of Re and Osiris. As a result of a common medium of communication and the prodigious efforts of the Amon priesthood, by the end of the Middle Kingdom this aspect of Egyptian thought had become common to almost all Egypt. There must have been a relationship between the clergy in the various parts of Egypt which approximated that existing between the central and nome governments. It is even possible that the priests were policy-makers in government during the Middle Kingdom. If this is true, it may have resulted in a semi-ecclesiastical form of government. We have no evidence that the priests held official positions, but they appear to have been in such positions that the

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[1]Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion, pp. 160-161.

religious policies they favored usually were implemented. It must be remembered here that Amon was not an artificial conception, even though he possessed little individuality inasmuch as he was an amalgam of all Egyptian gods.[1] Amon as a composite of all Egyptian gods was pushed into the position of patron deity of Egypt by the priests. From the merger of Amon with Re "most of the gods of cities and nomes are associated with Re--Solarized, one may say--with a view to religious centralization."[2]

Despite this apparent polytheism which was manifested so vividly when Egypt was not unified during the "First Intermediate Period," it "is certain that from the earliest times one of the greatest tendencies of Egyptian religion was toward monotheism." This "tendency may be observed in all important texts down to the latest period; it is also certain that a kind of polytheism existed in Egypt side by side with monotheism from very early times."[3] By the time of the Empire, what Budge considers as the co-existence of polytheism and monotheism was diminishing, for Egyptian religious thought was tending to become less rigid as religious doctrines were simplified. As the masses had been extended a chance to achieve immortality about the beginning of the Middle Kingdom, likewise they perhaps were led to understand that the supreme god Amon-Re was not human, immoral, and cruel, but a beneficent, moral creator who looked after

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[1]Erman, op. cit., p. 58.

[2]Moret, The Nile and Egyptian Civilization, p. 233.

[3]Budge, Egyptian Ideas of the Future Life, p. 14.

, the welfare of the Egyptians.

Before Amon-Re became paramount god in the Middle Kingdom he had usurped the positions of Re and Osiris. The dogmas and rituals of both Osiris and Re had occupied central positions in Egyptian thought. In fact, each deity had his own domain in Egyptian life. Moret points out that Re's province included all that pertained to creative power and organization of the world and society, while "everything connected with the maintenance of life, nourishment, the war with death, and resurrection after death is under Osiris."[1] As the state tended toward centralization, the Egyptians' belief about the function of Re and Osiris began to overlap and there was a fusion of the Re and Osirian myths.

> In the official doctrines of the XIIth Dynasty . . . [one finds that] the two gods have composed 'one single soul in two twins' ever since the day at Mendes, long ago, when Osiris met Re and the two gods embraced. In the universe, death and life, night and day, are complementary, one is the past, the other is future. Osiris is called Yesterday, 'Re is called To-morrow.'[2]

It will be recalled that the Osirian burial rites prior to the Twelfth Dynasty were dispensed to the Pharaoh only, and that Egyptians who achieved immortality did so because of their curious association with the Pharaoh. Moret and others suggest, however, that under the Middle Kingdom Osirian burial rites were dispensed not only to the Pharaoh but also to his subjects. According to Moret, all "Egyptians were promoted to immortality"

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[1]Moret, The Nile and Egyptian Civilization, pp. 384-385.

[2]Ibid., p. 385.

and did not achieve survival through some strange association with the Pharaoh.[1] We are not certain even now that Osirian rites were thought by Egyptians to confer immortality. For those Egyptians who achieved immortal life, their position in the "hereafter" was not thought to have differed very markedly from their earthly position. It was generally believed that a person who had lived a pious life on earth might be entitled to a reunion with his kinfolk in the hereafter.

During the Middle Kingdom, Egyptian religion demonstrates a tendency to become purer and more personal as the Egyptian became more sophisticated in thought and prospered under his economic and political systems. His conscience directed his intercourse with his fellow humans. He had only to respect and revere his deity, and obey his earthly ruler to achieve salvation.

Near the end of the Middle Kingdom, considerable change was taking place in the thought of the people. One inscription of Sesostris,[2] the Inscription of Sehetepibre,[3] and the Great Abydos Stela[4] tend to support the idea that Egyptian thought during the Middle Kingdom and into the period of the Hyksos rule

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[1] Ibid., p. 397. Cf. also Budge, op. cit., pp. x ff.; and Breasted, Dawn of Conscience, p. 50.

[2] Breasted, Ancient Records (5 vols.; Chicago, 1906), I, 243.

[3] Ibid., p. 327.

[4] Ibid., p. 336.

was in a process of change in which the idea of a singularity of deity was being tested for its soundness. We have noticed that Egyptians, at least the intellectuals, of the Old Kingdom believed that "a creative and controlling intelligence" had fashioned the world. They believed further that the Pharaoh was a representative on earth of that "unknowable" force. The fusion of the rituals and dogmas of Osiris and Re put Re into the position of being not only the "creator god and king of other gods" but also "god of eternity and everlastingness."[1] From the Middle Kingdom on less importance is given to the Osirian cult because the font of life and death come to be centered in one god who was symbolized by Amon-Re. The god Re (Amon-Re) acquired control over immortality by being merged with Osiris; that is, Amon-Re determined who was to be given eternal life. Since the Pharaoh, who could perhaps be approached only by those with god-like qualities, was the son of the deity we may be fairly certain that there was no belief commonly asserted by the people at a date earlier than we have suggested that they would achieve immortality. The Pharaoh and those closely associated with him were even in the Middle Kingdom perhaps thought to achieve immortality. It must be remembered that the Pharaoh had centralized in his person all the powers of Amon-Re; thus, if he had power to determine who was to live an after life, it is highly possible that his choice would fall upon that small coterie with whom he was familiar.

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[1]T. E. Peet, Cambridge Ancient History, I, 339.

We note that the sun in the inscription of Sesostris I is referred to as being within this God of the world. The sun appears merely as a manifestation of the God's power. The Inscriptions of Sehetepibre and of Neferhotep place the Pharaoh, apparently, in divine filiation with the "unknowable" God. As a result of this relationship the Pharaoh was able to see into the hearts of his subjects and to give life. More significant, however, is the fact that the Pharaoh was shifted into the position where he determined who was to achieve "everlasting life."

Egypt came under the domination of the Hyksos in the Thirteenth Dynasty and remained under their rule until the Eighteenth Dynasty. The Hyksos episode did not seriously affect the course of Egyptian thought, but it did serve to make the masses and, to an extent, the upper classes more reliant on the priesthood for divine guidance.

During this period, it seems the priests were always in a position to insure the implementation of the policies that they favored. The divinity of the Pharaoh, seemingly, was no longer seriously believed in by the educated classes, but the masses continued to believe that the Pharaoh was a sort of deity who represented Re and the member gods of the great body of the Ennead on earth.[1]

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[1]Cf. Breasted, A History of Egypt, pp. 266-283, 272, and 362; Georg Steindorff and Keith C. Seele, When Egypt Ruled the East (Chicago, 1942), pp. 221, 223-226, and 270.

The Hyksos invasion apparently generated insecurity and pessimism among members of the educated classes which caused them to doubt the divine powers of the Pharaoh. They may have wondered exactly what had gone wrong with the relationship between the Pharaoh and his father, Amon-Re. The intellectuals no doubt felt that they had conformed to the rules of the Pharaoh and had offered the necessary sacrifices to the gods; therefore, they could not understand why chaos prevailed throughout the land. The reliance of the nomarchs of the valley area on their armies and their priesthoods to oust the Hyksos invaders had the effect, it seems, of contributing to a disbelief in the magical aura supposedly surrounding the Pharaoh. In this connection, it is significant to note that the actual rulers during the reign of Thutmosids were either priests or persons closely allied with the priesthood.[1] Thutmose III for many years held the rank of prophet in the Karnak temple during which he won the support of the priesthood. After the death of Queen Hatshepsut, Thutmose III did not ascend the throne until the priesthood agreed to support him, though he had a legal right to succeed Queen Hatshepsut. The succession of Thutmose III to the throne was effected "by a highly dramatic coup d'état in the temple of Amon."[2]

During the reign of the Thutmosids, Amon definitely became

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[1]Breasted, A History of Egypt, pp. 242, 247, 267-268, and 272.

[2]Ibid., p. 268.

the paramount god. Since all the priests were not of the Amon priesthood, the Pharaoh perhaps circumvented possible opposition by endowing richly the temples of gods other than Amon. The Pharaoh, therefore, was either allied with the priesthood or he felt the gifts necessary to prevent opposition from the priesthood. In either case we cannot deny the importance of the priesthood.

In the Empire, Egyptian society was essentially corporate. There was no place for the existence of the individual as a recognizable social unit. The government was the integrative and regulative force in Egyptian society. It was the doctrine propagated by the priesthood through the arm of government that actually held the society together and impressed upon everyone the fact that each person had a prescribed position in the social hierarchy. There were no liberties extended to the individual by the state. It appears that throughout Egyptian history the king was viewed by his subjects as a divine being, even during times of political weakness.

While the Egyptian masses generally viewed the state as the divine institution of their forefathers, this view was not seriously shared by members of the upper classes. From the efforts of the Pharaoh to curb usurpation of his power, it seems that he was aware of the fact that the intellectuals were no longer awed by his divinity or that of his entourage. Nor were they any longer inspired by any idea that the authority of the Pharaoh and his entourage emanated from a divine source.[1] The

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[1]Cf. Breasted, A History of Egypt, pp. 272, 362; Stein-

Pharaoh's attempts to control the priesthood seem also to indicate that he realized that his authority was derived from the "organized church" which served as the bedrock of Egyptian society.[1]

It must be stated that, although there was fierce competition among several cliques of the upper classes for control of the government, none of them desired to change the traditional form of society. There were forces at work, however, which threatened change to Egyptian society regardless of how vigorously most Egyptians may have attempted to maintain the status quo. The expansion of Egyptian boundaries under the Theban Pharaohs of the Eighteenth Dynasty brought to Egypt immense wealth, a widened mental horizon, and cataclysmic ideas. The close relationship with other peoples and their ideas appears to have resurrected the Egyptian's tendency to be systematic and critical in his thinking. Apparently this sophisticated outlook implied destruction of the corporate society that had made for a stable world order similar to that of the celestial world of the gods.

The position of the Pharaoh was changed to the extent that he became a human king similar to those of the conquered nations of Asia. The reign of Amenophis III was one of enlightenment.

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dorff and Seele, op. cit., pp. 221, 223-226, 270; and W. F. Edgerton, "The Government and the Governed in the Empire," Journal of Near Eastern Studies, VI (July, 1947), 153, for a contrary interpretation.

[1]Breasted, A History of Egypt, pp. 272, 362; Steindorff and Seele, op. cit., pp. 221, 223-226, 270.

It was during his reign that we see a revival of critical thinking. In art and literature, Amenophis III even permitted himself to be pictured in a clear, realistic manner:

> As though he were no Egyptian king, he tells us how he slew 110 lions, that he chased a herd of wild oxen, and that a daughter of the king of Mitanni was sent to him accompanied by 317 maidens. But above all, he informs the world that he, the mighty king, has wedded Tyi, daughter of Yua and Tua, the favored child of private people, and has made her his queen. When we read this, and reflect how little such statements are in accordance with Egyptian sentiment of royalty, we cannot doubt his national position. Egypt then began, as we should now express it, to become a modern state, and it was under these circumstances that Amenophis IV ascended the throne and soon engaged in the conflict [with the Amon priesthood] which was destined for a time to divert all modes of thought into other directions.[1]

The conflict between Ikhnaton and the Amon priesthood is usually given as the reason Ikhnaton revolutionized Egyptian religious life by instituting monotheism in the place of polytheism. But this religious revolution of Ikhnaton cannot be adequately explained by singling out any one factor as having caused it. The causes are certainly many. Something was amiss in the society, but exactly what one cannot definitely ascertain. It may have been the oppression of the artisans, the discontent among the intellectuals, or the introduction of new ideas. Cultural forces were most assuredly at work which would have brought about something approaching the monotheism attributed to Ikhnaton even without Ikhnaton. But it is quite possible that Ikhnaton advanced the idea that Aton was a spirit and should be worshipped as such. Egyptian deities prior to Ikhnaton had

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[1]Erman, op. cit., p. 62.

been depicted as spirits who were manifestations of one supreme deity, represented by the Sun. What Ikhnaton did was to eliminate other deities. His actions indicate that he believed that his god, Aton, was the "sole god, whose power no other possesseth." We must point out here that Ikhnaton could not have forced a unification of deities without regard to the tradition of the people or independently of cultural forces. The tendency toward unification of the many Egyptian deities had been quite evident in Egyptian history from the Middle Kingdom, but was completed only during Ikhnaton's reign. As Whitehead has said, there are certain ideas which lie fallow for centuries, but which tend to fructify the society when they are resurrected and implemented.[1] This perhaps explains the apparently sudden appearance of monotheism during Ikhnaton's reign; if it does, the forceful implementation of the idea of monotheism is what can be attributed to Ikhnaton.

The idea of monotheism dates from about the Middle Kingdom. Theological speculation by the time of Ikhnaton's reign explained the universe as existing in Re, that the universe and the god were coterminous. Ikhnaton perhaps was fascinated by the new doctrine developed by the Amon priesthood which provided a sophisticated first cause for creation.

It will be noted that Re appears to have been the power behind the sun-disk god, Aton.[2] The solar cult of Re had been

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[1]Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York, 1933), pp. 15-18.

[2]Cf. Louis V. Zabkar, "The Theocracy of Amarna and the

propagated by the clergy of Heliopolis. Drioton and Vndier find a close relationship between the clergy of Heliopolis and Ikhnaton and believe that it was the Heliopolitan clergy that supported Ikhnaton.

> Pour les besoins du culte, le roi avait créé un collège sacerdotal nouveau dont le grand prêtre portait, comme autrefois le grand prêtre de Rē à Héliopolis, le titre de grand voyant . . . . Cette coincidence qui n'était certainement pas fortuite, semble prouver que le roi, pour accomplir sa révolution religieuse, s'était appuyé sur le clergé d'Héliopolis, dont le rôle, bien que beaucoup moins important que celui du clergé d'Amon était resté cependant très actif. D'allieurs le culte du Rē, comme celui d'Aton, était un culte solaire, et il est naturel de supposer que le clergé d'Héliopolis s'était . . . volontiers prêté à l'oeuvre réformatrice d'Akhnaton.[1]

The sensitive relationship existing between religion and politics seems to account for the cataclysmic chain of events during the reign of Ikhnaton. We are not sure if there is a real question as to whether these events are religious or political in origin. Ikhnaton was confronted, seemingly, with a situation in which he supposed that the priests of Amon-Re were wrong about both religion and politics. He believed both that the representation of the gods as quasi-human was contrary to metaphysical fact and that the priesthood exerted too much influence in government. He thought it would be practical to attempt to change the situation by severing politics from religion or by putting each in its proper sphere. In like manner,

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Doctrine of the Ba," Journal of Near Eastern Studies, XIII (April, 1954), 89; Breasted, Ancient Records, I, 349, 358; Moret, The Nile and Egyptian Civilization, pp. 318-319; H. H. Hall, Cambridge Ancient History, II, 324.

[1]Drioton and Vandier, op. cit., p. 334.

he wished to curb the constant competition between the army, the priesthood and the civil bureaucracy, each of whose aim was to usurp power from the Pharaoh and replace him with a new Pharaoh from its own clique.[1]

This competition began as early as the rule of Thutmose I and was rather constant until the reign of Amenophis III. It was in the latter part of his reign that competition for power in government among the various cliques became serious. Ikhnaton in the earlier part of his reign spent much of his energies checking the power of these cliques in government. Because of the importance of securing the conformity of everyone to the dictates of the state, he attempted to return to the ways of the Old Kingdom Pharaohs. He appears to have wanted all to believe that he was the representative on earth of Aton, whom he substituted for Amon-Re, and that all earthly power, even the existence of the state itself, emanated from him. As long as his conduct was in accord with divine law, conformity of things on earth supposedly occurred. Even though the army, the priesthood, and the civil bureaucracy behaved circumspectly as if to believe his assertations, Ikhnaton, an astute politician, was well aware that the real power lay not in his divinity but in their hands. He knew therefore that his position was precarious and could be made secure only in so far as he acquired absolute control of the machinery of government and the army.

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[1]Edgerton, "The Government and the Governed in the Empire," JNES, VI (July, 1947), 153; Breasted, A History of Egypt, pp. 362, 390-391.

This he apparently did for a short while.

Ikhnaton ended Egyptian participation in the war in Palestine and Syria. In religion, he was probably a deist and his decision in regard to the war was based perhaps on a sincere belief that Aton, his dynasty's patron god, would make a divine decision whether these outlying territories should be kept under Egyptian rule. As a politician, however, Ikhnaton's actions can be attributed to his struggle with the Amon priesthood, the army, and the civil bureaucracy for control of the reins of government. He must have been concerned chiefly with the influential position in government of the Amon priesthood and must have sought, therefore, to diminish it. He was perhaps too busy fortifying his position and curbing the influence of the Amon priesthood to quell disturbances in Egypt's outlying territories.

We shall not argue here that Ikhnaton, by propagating the doctrine of monotheism and placing himself in divine filiation with the deity, was the "first individual in human history," "a religious fanatic," a "peculiar genius," or had a "remorselessly clear mind." Records do not show conclusively that Ikhnaton saw that "the universality of his god meant monotheism" or that "with his rigid devotion to truth there could be no room for tolerance of the easy-going old cult of the other gods."[1] It is also rather fruitless to attempt to show from inadequate

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[1]James Haikie, The Amarna Age(1st ed.; London, 1926), p. 315.

records whether Ikhnaton "was fully convinced that he might entirely recast the world of religion" and that the "men about him must have been irresistibly swayed by his unbending will."[1] The nature of the religion of Aton suggests that only one segment of the population--the intellectuals--adhered to it. It is well established that the religion of Aton was an exclusive religion,[2] but it is highly possible that it was not exclusive because Ikhnaton was a lofty idealist. Ikhnaton may have suppressed the worship of other deities simply in order to find sanction for suppressing the Amonist priesthood.

Possibly he or others were thereafter struck with the logical soundness of the idea of singularity of deity. It is precisely in this idea of singularity of deity that we begin to discern that there were no fundamental differences between the Memphite Theology and the Amarna Theology. I have suggested earlier that the Memphite Theology tends to indicate that Egyptian thought was becoming sophisticated. It indicates further that, at the time of the IVth Dynasty, the Egyptians were moving along gradually, acquiring as rational an understanding of the world as their limited knowledge would allow.

A comparison of the Amarna Theology with the Memphite Theology produces some rather interesting and instructive insights:

Memphite Theology[3]

[Ptah] created the local gods . . .

[He] put the gods in their places of worship, he fixed their

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[1]Breasted, A History of Egypt, p. 362.

[2]Drioton and Vandier, op. cit., p. 335.

[3]Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion, p. 23; Breasted, A History of Egypt, p. 357.

offerings, he founded their chapels.

He made their bodies (statues) resemble that which pleased their hearts (that is, the forms in which they desired to be manifested).

Ptah, the great, is the mind and tongue of the gods.

Ptah, from whom proceeded the power of the mind,
and of the tongue.

That which comes forth from every mind,
and from every mouth;
Of all gods, of all people, of all cattle, of all reptiles,
Everything that he [Ptah] wills.

Amarna Theology[1]

[Aton] How manifold are all thy works!
They are hidden from before us,
O thou sole god, whose powers no other possesseth.
Thou didst create the earth according to thy desire.

While thou was alone:
Men, all cattle large and small,
All that are upon the earth,
That go about upon their feet;
All that are on high,
That fly with their wings,
The countries of Syria and Nubia,
The land of Egypt;
Thou settest every man in his place,
Thou suppliest their necessities.
Every one has his possessions,
and his days are reckoned.
Their tongues are divers in speech,
Their forms likewise and their skins,
For thou divider, hast divided the peoples.

One may conclude from these excerpts that both the Memphite and Amarna Theologies indicate that the priests were engaged in much speculation about the universe. The main difference is to be found in the amount of physical knowledge available to the people in each of the two periods to explain natural phenomena.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 373-374.

Wilson has suggested that there was not a change in the thinking of the Egyptians.[1] Because Egyptians never reshaped the fundamental forms handed them by their predecessors, it is Wilson's belief that accepted norms defined the scope of Egyptian thought. As between the Memphite and the Amarna Theologies, however, there was a change in the thinking of the Egyptians. Further, it seems that Wilson's idea that Egyptian thought did not change because of a "tacit interdict" is a figment of his imagination. There is common ground between the two theologies, but the excerpts quoted above show that the Memphite Theology was concerned chiefly with showing a relationship of unity between all the Egyptian gods with one God predominating, whereas the Amarna Theology asserts singularity and denies the very existence of other gods. Moreover, the Amarna Theology finds variety no longer in deity, but in living things, countries, and languages. We must, however, remark here in fairness to Wilson that it is possible to argue that the Amarna Theology could well be an actual later opinion derived from and based upon the Memphite Theology. Of course, we do not know from records that it was.

We must be conscious of one fact, as we conclude our discussion of Egyptian thought; that is, Egyptian thought was expressed always in a religious medium. The reason that all, or nearly all, thought in early cycles of civilization is concerned with religion (which only means that it remains somewhat mythological even in its most critical developments) is that

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[1]cf. p. 10.

knowledge is to an important extent cumulative from cycle to cycle; one cycle recovers to some extent what the previous cycle learned. Hence the "renaissance" phenomenon is very marked in some cycles, less so in others. It is only in late cycles, Western or third Chinese, for example, that the emancipation from religion is a clear and palpable phenomenon. While thought remains within a religious frame, the chief, though not necessarily the only, thinkers are priests. This is not the full explanation of the phenomenon, but it is certainly the core of it.

CHAPTER II

CHINESE THOUGHT FROM THE HAN TO THE MING DYNASTY

In our discussion so far we have seen to what extent Egyptian thought was dominated by the conception that the universe was created by a supreme deity who, in various manifestations, was responsible for its operation and for man's wellbeing within it.

China presents us with rather a different outlook. The Chinese were not particularly religious, nor did they suggest in their writings that the universe was the result of the conscious act of a supreme deity.[1] The important deity of the Chinese in the Han period was T'ien, or "Heaven," who controlled the occurrences of human and natural events. The divinities during the Han were not, it seems, regarded as anthropomorphic beings.[2] The Chinese presumably thought of them as principles or symbols, or both, and as having composite form. Wright points out that this is apparent even in pre-Confucianist literature.

> [The] qualities of T'ien were not strongly emphasized, nor

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[1]Arthur F. Wright (ed.), Studies in Chinese Thought (Chicago, 1953), p. 23; Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde, II (Princeton, 1953), 8; Joseph Needham, "Human Laws and Laws of Nature in China and the West," Journal of the History of Ideas, XII (April, 1951), 214-228.

[2]H. G. Creel, Sinism (Chicago, 1929), p. 126; J. K. Shryock, The Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius (New York, 1932), pp. 82-89.

> was this divinity described as being the creator of the universe. Moreover, passages can easily be found in which the word does not have a religious significance at all but is simply used as a name for the physical sky. With the rise of philosophical speculation, therefore, it became possible for the old theistic conception to give way to a much more naturalistic and depersonalized point of view.[1]

The origin of the universe and of the world of man did not seem perplexing to the Chinese mind. The Chinese believed that the phenomena and movement of the universe were inherent in the universe and were not due to outside intervention. Furthermore, they believed that the "universe came into existence, not by an act of creative will but by spontaneous exfoliation. The one became the many. Tao was the order underlying all things, the universal law."[2] There is no suggestion that the temporal society was a duplication in structure and social organization of the celestial one.

Earthly government was thought necessary to insure the welfare of the people. Heaven would signify by physical phenomena whether the government, which was vested in the "Son of Heaven," was good and should be maintained, or was bad and should be replaced. The government was a product of centuries of organic development and was thought by Confucianists to be good or bad in direct proportion to the moral character of the ruler. Chinese society did not adhere to a conception of the ruler's divinity; nor did the subjects owe blind allegiance to the ruler. The doctrine was simply that the ruler received his right to rule

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[1]Wright, op. cit., p. 20; cf. W. Wei, The Spirit of Chinese Culture (New York, 1947), p. 52.

[2]A. E. Haydon, Biography of the Gods (New York, 1946), p. 2.

through a "Mandate of Heaven." The ruler was appointed by Heaven because of his moral qualities. Once chosen, the rulership became hereditary, but nothing is found in the writings of the Confucianists to explain the mode of succession. Since the crown was not transferred by primogeniture, it may well have been that the interrention of T'ien usually led the ruler to pick the most efficient inheritor. An evil ruler, nevertheless, was removed by Heaven; a decree was given to an opponent to take his place. The ministers were believed to have been implored by Heaven to remove the ruler and, in the event of a failure, rebellion was initiated in an attempt to depose him. The will of Heaven, when sought, was made known by divination.

Confucianism immediately prior to and during the period of the Han Empire emphasized the importance of harmonious relations between men on earth. In its philosophical speculation, there was a conscious and successful attempt to blot out the diea of a personal god, maker of the universe.[1] The Taoists, however, appear never to have held a belief in the existence of a supreme god, maker of the universe. While Confucianists and Taoists seem to have differed profoundly in their philosophies, they were both suspicious of the popular religions devoted to various gods. Their main difference lay, not in their conception of the universe and the place of man therein, but in the method which was to be utilized to achieve a good, harmonious life on earth.

We are primarily concerned here with Chinese thought on a

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[1]Sheldon Cheney, Men Who Have Walked with God (New York, 1946), p. 2.

sophisticated level, and not with Chinese thought as it may be evidenced in literature, art, or religion. But we must understand that Chinese thought on a sophisticated level was largely derived from the social, political, and religious ideas of the common people. Our discussion will deal mainly with the three philosophical schools (Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism) of this period. There is, however, as Kristeller has pointed out, a nexus between the thought of the common people and that of intellectuals.

> Philosophy proper emerged from the much broader area of general thought through the development of a conscious and elaborate method and tradition. As the technical terms of philosophy are based on words of the general language, so the problems and solutions of philosophical thought are often transformations and elaborations that correspond to the trends and currents of general thought.[1]

The Han Empire covers a period of political change and a great deal of Chinese thought of the period is political in nature. This is evident in Confucianist writings.

As a philosophical teaching, Confucianism changed radically and became rather syncretic as the old teachings of Confucius were modified in what is called the New Text School, of whom Tung Chung Shu was the foremost representative. It enjoyed court favor in the Han Empire and its exponents were charged during Wu Ti's reign with the responsibility of administering the empire. There were, however, several other philosophical and religious systems in the empire, including those of the Taoists, Shamanists, and Legalists. But Confucianism gained supremacy over

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[1]Paul Kristeller, "The Philosophical Significance of the History of Thought," Journal of the History of Ideas, VII (April, 1946), 364.

other dogmas as the cult of the state mainly because of the prevailing opinion that it was the philosophy most capable of maintaining political and cultural stability throughout the empire. Within its system of beliefs, it was felt, the current superstitions, customs, and folkways of all sections of the empire were harmonized. At the same time, it rendered difficult any attempt by the nobility--composed of the descendants of earlier Liu and of local magnates of pre-imperial times--to regain the power it had lost and lessened the dependence of the ruler upon his family and the nobility.

As the state cult of the Han, Confucianism zealously promoted the idea that an ordered and stable society was in conformity with the laws of the universe. Ancient legends, folklore, and writings were edited with that idea in mind. This use of popular religious elements by the Confucianists gave rise to the Old Text School near the end of the Han. It was their purpose to purge Confucianist doctrine of popular religious elements and regain the actual meaning of the ideas of Confucius. Subsequently, scholars of the New Text School developed a theology in this ordered and stable society which exalted Heaven as a deity above all others.[1] By virtue of his righteousness, the emperor alone was able to perform sacrifices to Heaven, and prosperity generally throughout the empire was thought to be dependent on the emperor's conduct.

Confucianist scholars came to believe in the Five Elements

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[1]C. P. Fitzgerald, China: A Short Cultural History (New York, 1938), pp. 214-215.

of the Yin and Yang. They taught that each dynasty's rule was marked by one of the five elements and when that element's predominance was eclipsed by another element a new dynasty arose. This doctrine was an evolutionary force in Chinese thought. Society was not endlessly stable. It was dynamic, but there was no disorganization accompanying changes in Chinese society. It was believed that the relationship between all elements of the society and between society and the universe were, or ought to be, harmonious. Confucianists thought that the harmony of the temporal world with the universe (Tao) was all that could be desired. Such an achievement signified that the ruler was above reproach in his moral conduct and in the performance of his governmental duties. In practice, Confucianism became during the period of the Han Empire not only a religion but also a social, a political, and even a natural philosophy.[1] Any great misfortune that beset society was thought to have been caused by the inability of the emperor to live up to the established modes of conduct. Society, as an integral part of the universe, would prosper only to the extent that it adjusted itself to the principles of the universe.

Han Confucianism, as a cult with formulated beliefs, adhered to and attempted to enforce orthodoxy in the empire. This is usually true of any set of philosophical principles established as a religion. Religion, per se, is not burdened with systematized beliefs and hence the question of orthodoxy or un-

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[1]Shryock, op. cit., pp. 42-43; Creel, op. cit., pp. 19-36.

orthodoxy does not arise. But when a system of philosophical tenets is merged with a theological system, there is a tendency to propagate a particular doctrine at the expense of all others. It is, then, not difficult to see why the Han Confucianists were exponents of a set of beliefs which prescribed very clearly the acceptable and unacceptable action and mode of conduct for the people, and advocated "political and social reorganization by changing the social mind through political action."[1] Actually Han Confucianism was a compilation of Legalist and Confucianist ideas. The Legalists believed that stringent laws should be used to check human nature, whereas orthodox Confucianists believed that "instruction" was superior to force or coercion.

> Thus arose a curious contradiction of Chinese society; it was a state based on the rule of moral authority, honouring learning above birth or wealth, ruling through a class of men of letters rather than by means of military power and police authority. On the other hand, there was a system applied to the lowly and ignorant which was based on fear as the only deterrent, and exercised through civil and barbarous penalties. Justice and benevolence, Confucian ideas, were prominent in the theory of government, but absent in the legal tribunals. Force and severity, absent in the theory of government, were the basis of the legal system. The theory of government came from the Confucian school, the practice had retained most of the ideas of the Legists [Legalists].[2]

The rulers of the Han Empire sought to use Confucianism to legitimatize themselves as rulers, and to raise their position to that of divine mortals sent by Heaven to head the state. The orthodox Confucianist scholars in the Han period, however, as Fitzgerald points out, were "sedulous in their efforts to foster

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[1]L. S. Hsu, Political Philosophy of Confucianism (New York, 1932), p. 49.

[2]Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 103.

the cult of Heaven, the supreme power which would hold in awe the mighty autocrat of the empire," and they "interpreted the ancient legends in accordance with this conception."[1] As Creel says,

> For the monarch, the prime duty was to follow the Tao, the cosmically sanctioned mode of action. So long as he did this, he properly filled the station of king, and was approved and supported by Heaven. When he failed to do this, he ceased to be king, in fact if not in form, and Heaven was certain sooner or later, to replace him with another who would follow the right path.[2]

Chinese thought during the Han period was pervaded with the conception of the Five Elements of the Yin and Yang. The Chinese conception of the universe and of man's place therein tends to appear as a mixture of physical and ethical knowledge. That is to say, through their attempt to reconcile morally their earthly existence with the "way of the universe," the Chinese thought they could rid themselves of ills in their society. While it seems that the Chinese were naturalists rather than moralists and had a clear understanding of the universe, they nevertheless relied largely on the experience of their ancestors to give them solutions to the perplexities of the world. Otherwise, they used divination to discover the solution to their problems.

It is largely the Confucianists' reliance on divination that accounts for their loss of prestige in government as the empire collapsed. Their excessive reliance on divination to

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[1] Ibid., p. 124.

[2] Op. cit., p. 122.

formulate policies and decisions in the operation of the government presumably accounts also for the reaction against the use of the Yin-Yang ideology by Confucianists. Finally, one suspects that the development of the Yin-Yang ideology indicates that the Chinese conception of the universe and the place of man therein was assuming a fixed and definite form and that the Chinese attempt always to view everything as a whole. It was because of this attempt that it is suggested that Chinese thought was sophisticated even as the empire went into decline.

The period following the fall of the Han Empire was one of turmoil, during which Neo-Taoism assumed a prominent position in Chinese thought. Taoism appears always to have been a mystical strain in Chinese thought. Because of its animism and magic, it appealed largely to the masses. Its philosophy was rejected by the Confucianists, although both were essentially political in nature. The supposed founder of Taoism, Lao Tse, agreed with the Confucianist idea that society and the cosmic process must harmonize, but he insisted that there would be a natural realization of harmony if things were left to work themselves out. The quickest way to find the Tao was in contemplation.

> Lao Tse declares that virtue and righteousness, filial piety and paternal affection (all dear to the heart of Confucius), were never heard of until after the world had fallen into disorder; the way to regain that natural harmony which is the only hope of the world is to dispense with all these artificial, and therefore vain attempts to win felicity. The Confucian politician, Lao Tse says, deems himself born master and the professional savior of all things.[1]

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[1]Creel, op. cit., p. 98.

According to Lao Tse, the "emperor and his minister and assistants in government were not put in their places to interfere; their duty was to mediate the Tao."[1] He advanced the idea that the way to control the people was to "empty the minds and fill the stomachs, enfeeble the initiative and strengthen the backs of men, and to keep the people in 'ignorance and apathy.'"[2]

The Taoist philosophy put emphasis on immortality. Immortal life was enjoyed on earth, not in the spiritual world.[3] The Taoist advocated a return to the "golden age," an age conceived as a state wherein society was free from all ills. This state was realized only when the emperor conformed to the established modes of conduct.[4] Each man, it was thought, would enjoy during the "golden age" a life of abundance and happiness on earth. We find no evidence to suggest the existence of a philosophical belief that after death they would be given everlasting life in the cosmos.

As mentioned earlier, no Chinese thinker admits that there was a conscious act of creation.[5] Creation to the Taoists was the result of an evolutionary process. The universe, it was thought, had developed from a stage of primordial simplicity to

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[1] Ibid., p. 99.

[2] Ibid., pp. 98-99.

[3] Ibid., p. 100; cf. J. J. M. DeGroot, The Religion of the Chinese (New York, 1910), p. 130.

[4] Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 170; DeGroot, op. cit., pp. 46-49.

[5] Wright, op. cit., p. 23.

one of complexity. To Lao Tse, the Tao was the integrating and controlling force in the universe. He does not say explicitly that the Tao is a divine celestial law-giver, or a creator in the sense of the Hebrews or the Greeks. He says that the "Tao produced Oneness. Oneness produced Duality. Duality evolved into Trinity, and Trinity evolved into the myriad things."[1] He seems, therefore, to be thinking of the Tao as a principle which mechanistically interacts with non-being to produce being. In fact the Tao is regarded as a wholly spontaneous principle without any trace of personality.[2] The proposition that things come from non-being and evolve to different stages of development appears to have provided a rather satisfactory answer about the first cause for Chinese thinkers.

The source of the pervading force in the Tao is not manifest, however, and is never actually given much consideration. An explanation of this force does not come within the purview of the human mind. The Taoists were skeptical about attributing the order in society, or even the origin of society itself, to the act of a divine, celestial lawgiver. Chinese society was not thought to be "ordained by a rational personal being . . . . There was no confidence that the code of nature's law could be unveiled and read, because there was no assurance that a divine being . . . had ever formulated such a code or made it readable. One feels, indeed, that the Taoists, for example, would have scorned such an idea as being too naive to be adequate to the

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[1] Ibid., p. 22.

[2] Ibid., pp. 23-24; DeGroot, op. cit., p. 102.

subtlety and complexity of the universe as they intuited it."[1]

The Neo-Taoist school became important in Chinese thought from about the third century and remained so until the tenth century A. D. This school of thinkers was ably represented by Hsiang Hsiu and Kuo Hsiang. It was this group who largely modified Taoist teachings. In the Chuang-tsu Commentary, edited by Hsiang Hsiu, there is no attempt to give a conceptual definition of the Tao. Rather the Chuang-tsu suggests that since the Tao is responsible for and pervades all being it is incomprehensible to the human mind. Man may speculate about it, but he will never know more than he is able to deduce from its many manifestations. Therefore, one who directs himself to explaining what the Tao is does not himself know what it is. While a general understanding of the universe might be within the reach of man, there was no chance of his ever comprehending the first cause, the origin of the universe. He could observe, however, the interaction of human and natural law which made for a harmonious world.

Furthermore, the Chuang-tsu states that the Tao produced the world and is inherent in everything.[2] The question is raised whether the Tao is prior to all things and is supreme non-being. If so, how can Tao as non-being be the source of existence?[3] Since things are continuously produced, Hsiang

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[1]Joseph Needham, "Natural Law in China and Europe," Journal of the History of Ideas, XII (April, 1951), 229.

[2]Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., p. 208.

[3]Ibid.

concludes that they come into being spontaneously. He says "things are spontaneously what they are. There is nothing that causes them to be such."[1] Further, he says, "everything is spontaneously what it is . . . . . everything produces itself and does not issue from anything else."[2] He later points out that there is an intimate relationship between "things" of the universe and concludes that the relationship is necessary.[3]

It is in this idea of intimate universal relationships existing among things of the universe that we see an elaboration in Taoist doctrine. Further, we see that Neo-Taoists did not differ too much from the Confucianist belief that the universe was made up of relationships and that it was only when there was disharmony among the elements of the whole relationship that ills befell the society.

Whereas orthodox Taoists took refuge in the concept of the changeless Tao,[4] the Neo-Taoists conceived of society as being in a state of constant change due to the "impact of "inevitable forces.[5] It was thought that institutions should keep abreast of changes and that people should not cling to the traditional modes of life merely because they were regarded as sacred. Taoists thought that adherence to old procedures and institutions

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 209.

[3] Ibid., p. 210.

[4] Haydon, op. cit., p. 181.

[5] Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., p. 214.

despite the trends of the time demonstrated an inability to conform with the natural way of things.[1] This inability to make adjustment to natural law signalized, they thought, "the beginning of artificiality."[2] They challenged the Confucianists, saying:

> . . . those who imitate the sages imitate what they have already done. But what they have done is something already gone and therefore cannot meet the changes (of the present). Why, then, should we respect and cling to it? If we cling to the crystallized achievements (of the past) as a means for dealing with the amorphous (present), then the crystallized (past) acts as an obstruction to the amorphous (present).[3]

A closer look at the doctrine of both the Taoists and Confucianists reveals that there must have been a considerable interchange of ideas. Both doctrines explained societal development as a result of evolution. To be sure, they must both have relied on the Yin-Yang ideology which viewed the world as experiencing endless evolution.

Neo-Taoists differed from Lao Tse on the cause of human misery in society. Human misery, they believed, was a result of man's inability to remain at peace and to curb his desires.[4] Harmony was restored in society after the people had been made aware of what was right and what was wrong.[5] They agreed with

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., pp. 214-215.

[4] Ibid., p. 226.

[5] Ibid., p. 228; Needham, op. cit., p. 213.

Lao Tse that "instruction" on the prescribed modes of conduct was necessary in society. But, the Taoists believed that differentiation was necessary in society. Every man, they thought, must be taught his position in society. They insisted it was a natural principle that "the more talented should be the rulers and the less talented subjects . . . . Though each 'has its own particular duty,' they at the same time function on behalf of one another [and] once we recognize this principle, the differences between eminence and lowliness become equalized."[1]

The discussion above has demonstrated that the Neo-Taoists did not prescribe the solidarity and contemplative life formerly advocated by orthodox Taoists. Neo-Taoists evidently wanted to apply their teachings directly to the affairs of men. This is an example of a conjunction in Confucian and Taoist thought. The Neo-Taoists seem no longer concerned with withdrawal from the world or with seeking a remedy for the ills of society through a mystical readjustment between the universe and the world of men. They appear to have attempted to change things through earthly application of workable doctrine. Neo-Taoist doctrine was accepted by both the "literate" and the masses because all wanted a secure and happy existence on earth with a termination of prevailing lawlessness and disorder. Finally, we may say that both Confucianism and Taoism were intimately related to politics and apparently were used to a greater or lesser degree either as instruments of statecraft or as means of

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[1] Ibid., pp. 227-228.

controlling the actions and beliefs of the people.[1]

Meanwhile, between the fourth and tenth centuries A. D., Buddhism became the popular religion, largely among the masses. The ruling class, however, found the new religion quite acceptable as a means of control and of maintaining their position. But some Confucianist scholars, disturbed by their own loss of status, sought to reestablish the old Confucianist doctrines as the cult of the ruling class. This movement was signalized in the T'ang period by Fu I. He rejected Buddhism and sought to revive Confucianism because he believed Buddhism to be alien to Chinese tradition. But he realized that Confucianism could not regain its position as a cult of the ruling class unless it became more appealing to them than Buddhism. He argued for "an amalgam of Confucian and Taoist ideas."[2] This fusion would, Fu I thought, make Confucianism "the viable spiritual and intellectual alternative to Buddhism." His attempt met with little success, for the ruling group, even those who were in sympathy with Confucianist doctrines, doubted that Confucianism could meet the intellectual and spiritual need that Buddhism satisfied because they considered Confucianism anachronistic from a religious viewpoint.

Han Yü also advocated a return to Confucian principles. He did not believe that the "monastic ideal of Buddhism" or "the [orthodox] Taoist ideal of the recluse" was the best way to al-

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[1]Shryock, op. cit., p. 85.

[2]Arthur F. Wright, "Fu I and the Rejection of Buddhism," Journal of the History of Ideas, XII (January, 1951), 44.

leviate the ills of society.[1]

> What concerned him was the essential teachings of the classics, reduced to their simplest terms. These were the ethical precepts which underlay good government and social harmony; chiefly the Five Human Relations or Obligations between ruler and subject, father and child, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, and friend and friend, together with the personal virtues proper to each. For Han Yü a return to the Ancient Way involved primarily moral reform and not political reform . . . .[2]

There were many other thinkers from the T'ang to the Sung Dynasty who paved the way for a revival of Confucianist doctrines. The efforts of Chou Tun-yi, Shao Yung, Chang Tsai, and the Ch'eng brothers actually did occasion a revival of Confucianist principles under the Sung Dynasty. It was largely as a result of the efforts of Chu Hsi (Chu Tzu, A. D. 1130-1200) that Confucianism finally regained its position of prominence in Chinese thought and government.

Chu Hsi was the synthesizer of main elements of thought from both Buddhism and Taoism which he used to invigorate Confucianist doctrine. While Chu Hsi and his followers worked to restore Confucianism to its former position in society, they were not content to accept the traditional interpretations and sought, therefore, to find new meanings in Confucianist writings. One must recognize that the Confucianism of the Sung period and later underwent a modification in many of the concepts held by the Han Confucianists and Neo-Taoists. It appears that the Neo-Confucianists were more rationalistic than were their predecessors

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[1] Ibid.

[2] W. Theodore DeBarry, "A Reappraisal of Neo-Confucianism," in Wright, op. cit., p. 86.

in explaining the universe and government. Unlike their predecessors, they did not believe that social ills could be remedied only as a result of adherence to the rule of Heaven by the Emperor. Conformity to the Tao was not the way to bring about adjustment in society. Neo-Confucianists also believed that society could be reformed through education as well as through moral instruction. They believed that rulers who wished to better society should pursue their jobs with vigor and sincerity in order to earn the respect of the people of society. Moreover, Neo-Confucianists believed that, if the people had confidence in the ruler's programs of action, they would help him fulfill them. There is little suggestion here that the emperor had only to live morally for any ills in society to adjust themselves and for society to prosper.

The Neo-Confucianists still held to the organismic concept of development of the universe. Instead of using the Tao to designate the basic principle behind the universe as did the old Confucianists, the Neo-Confucianists spoke of the "Supreme Ultimate." "The Supreme Ultimate is . . . made up of the Principles for all things in the universe, as brought together in a single whole . . . ."[1] Chu Hsi suggested that "the Supreme Ultimate itself . . . is to be found everywhere. . . . the Supreme Ultimate . . . is something profound, mysterious, and imperceptible; yet within it are fully contained principles governing (the visible manifestations of) movement and quiescence [of] the yin and yang."[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 88.

[2] Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., p. 539.

The Neo-Confucianists believed also that there was periodic maladjustment in society as a result of the movement from one stage of development to another.[1] Unlike the Neo-Taoists who preceded them, the Neo-Confucianists did not comprehend the essence of the concept of the "Supreme Ultimate." When speaking of the origin of the universe, they suggest that there was something prior to the existence of the "Supreme Ultimate," but just what it was, the Neo-Confucianists do not clearly explain.[2] It is perhaps their advanced intellectual development which prevented them from attributing the origin of the universe to a creator god. When their scientific inquiries failed to give them a first cause explanation of the universe and of men, the Chinese used the Yin-Yang ideology to explain the evolutionary development of the universe and man. In fact, they even subscribed to the idea that man was created as a result of spontaneous generation. This idea seems to suggest that perhaps the world also resulted from spontaneous generation, and that behind the supreme ultimate was the interaction of non-being elements to produce things as the Neo-Confucianists conceptualized them. The universe to the Neo-Confucianists was presumably a result of spontaneous generation, while the cosmic cycle, by which they explained the changes that took place in society, was a result of moral law (li) and material ether (chi). Again, we see that a series of relationships made up the universe and was also the reason for its smooth functioning. Chu Hsi suggests that the "organization of society can proceed only in accord to a certain

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[1] Ibid., p. 538.

[2] Ibid., p. 549.

Principle. . . . beneath Heaven, it is only this normative principle that unto the end we cannot follow."[1]

In society, the Neo-Confucianists believed that social relationships were necessary. Further, they believed that human society operated according to basic principles and that, unless society adhered closely to them maladjustment occurred. These same principles were thought responsible for the constant change that took place in society. It was man's ability to adjust himself to this change that told whether he understood satisfactorily the principles on which the universe operated.

It is quite clear from written documents that the

> . . . Sung Confucianists reinterpreted the various phrases of philosophical suggestiveness in the old classics, unwittingly filling them with a new content, and offering a systematic relationship between them. Chu Hsi was not without his opponents in his own time, notably Lu Hsiang Shan. But after the alien Mongol dynasty had passed (1280-1368) and the native Ming had been established (1368-1644),--Chu's Neo-Confucianism was given the stamp of orthodoxy.[2]

It was in Ming times that Chinese thought received its last great impetus. Wang Shou-jen (usually referred to as Wang Yang-Ming) did not agree with the interpretation given the Confucianist classics by Chu Hsi. Wang suspected that Chi Hsi and his followers were merely imitators of the past. He set himself to the task of correcting their misunderstanding of the ancients by emphasizing that they should rely on their own minds to resolve

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[1] Ibid., p. 550.

[2] Lyman V. Cady, "An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CLIII (April, 1930), 37-38.

crises and not look to the ancients for the solution. Wang took the position that the limits of knowing were within the mind.[1] Even one's understanding of morality must be grasped intuitively inasmuch as morality is inherent in the nature of the mind. When men deviated from the established norms in society, Wang suggests, they did so because selfishness and passion had prevented the mind from functioning perceptively. Selfishness and passion upset that equilibrium which must exist between man and all things.[2]

> . . . Wang was a real idealist, holding that the mind is all, embracing heaven and earth and all things. Everywhere it is the same mind, and everywhere marked by the same intuitive knowledge and moral principles.[3]

Wang did not agree with Chu Hsi that the human mind is composed, as is the Supreme Ultimate, of "multitudinous Principles, with which it responds to all things."[4] He insisted that Chu Hsi erred in attempting to show that the mind could be separated from the Principle which governs the function of the universe. This means that "even when the mind is physically non-existent, Principle itself eternally subsists."[5] Wang believed that the mind was itself a principle and insisted that every phenomenon in nature was associated with that principle. He concluded "that unless there be mind, there will be no Principle."[6] It is quite

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[1]Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., p. 502.

[2]Ibid., p. 615.

[3]Cady, op. cit., p. 38.

[4]Fung Yu-lan, op. cit., p. 607.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

clear that "for Chu Hsi nature is Principle, whereas for Wang Shou-jen the mind is Principle."[1]

On the subject of evil in society, Wang said that it is a result of "the failure of our feelings and desires to conform with what is proper."[2] He insisted, however, that this did not mean that something was inherently wrong or bad with the nature of man. He believed that man determined by his actions what he wanted to be considered as good or as evil. Man, he thought, usually associated unacceptable actions with some external object. This he considered unhealthy because we begin to set up standards and are unable to "preserve our mind in its original state of unperturbedness. Thus since our likes and dislikes are both inherent, our method should be that of the sage, whose 'emotions accord with all things, yet (of himself) he has no emotions.'"[3]

In conclusion, we must be aware that, though Wang Shou-jen was an idealist, he was not entirely wrong when he conceived the mind to be the source of knowledge and mediator of conduct. By reducing his interpretation of human conduct in society to a rather simplistic form in order to attempt to solve the evils in his society, he laid a basis upon which human conduct could be adequately explained. Moreover, such a solution as his did not, in the final analysis, attribute the cause of human action to a mystical source that could not be rationalized.

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[1] Ibid., p. 609.

[2] Ibid., p. 615.

[3] Ibid., p. 618.

CHAPTER III

COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION

In regard to their views of the world it has become obvious that the Chinese and Egyptians living during the respective periods of our study formulated their ideas around very different premises. The Egyptians thought of the world as the handiwork of their god. In fact, they attributed to him the origin of all things. On the other hand, the Chinese thought that the world was the result of spontaneous generation. They did not consider the origin of the world as the work of a supernatural being. One might conclude from this that the trend of Chinese thought during the period from the Han Dynasty to the Ming Dynasty was of a scientific, realistic nature. It is true that one cannot impute scientific methods equivalent to those of the West to the Chinese of this era, but the fact that they located the origin of the world in the interaction of its constituent parts seems to indicate the kind of mentality which could lead toward the development of scientific thought. They tried to solve problems by examination of the elements directly concerned and not by attributing the reasons for the unknown to a supernatural being, who functioned, more or less, as a catch-all for inexplicable occurrences.

The Egyptians worshipped an anthropomorphic god who lived in a world quite similar to the world of the earthly god. He could easily be likened to any autocratic ruler. He delegated

duties to other gods in much the same manner that mundane rulers dispersed their functions among lesser officials. He was the supreme ruler of heaven and earth. On the other hand, the Chinese developed no concept of an anthropomorphic god; their concept of deity was limited to a guiding principle. This deity, T'ien, possessed no human attributes. Most Chinese believed that earthly actions had to conform to this supreme principle in order to prevent chaos from disturbing the world.

This difference in the conception of deity in the two societies, which was much less important than the different cosmological outlooks, serves mainly to illustrate further the basic difference between the Chinese and Egyptian societies. The Egyptians were subjected to the rule of the supreme deity, his lesser gods, and the Pharaoh; while the Chinese, being well aware of the consequences of non-conformity to nature, had more freedom of action. The Chinese are more like the adult in modern societies who, with full cognizance of the consequences of any course he may pursue, makes his own decisions.

The priests were the intermediaries between the masses and the gods in Egyptian society. They usually conducted divination rites to discern what the gods considered the proper application of the guiding principle to human existence. The Chinese also relied on divination during this period, but we find that the emphasis was more strongly religious in Egyptian life than in Chinese life.

The Chinese had no conception of an after life in the sense that such an existence would parallel life on earth. There was

a belief, however, that their ancestors would make themselves known through spiritual means and guide the living in the correct way of existence, but their conception never reached the proportions of the Egyptian belief that the body also existed in the after life. It must be noted, however, that many authorities are of the opinion that only the Pharaoh and his entourage achieved immortality during this period. One might conclude that the Chinese trend of thought was "this-worldly" while the Egyptians were strongly "other-worldly." The Chinese were very much concerned with life on earth while the Egyptians were preoccupied with the propitiation of the gods and other aspects of the supernatural.

In Egypt the status of the individual was determined by divine law and was permanent. There was very little chance of change in a man's status. Chinese society, on the other hand, was stratified with each individual having a definite social position, but change in status was possible. A man could elevate himself if he possessed the ability and training.

The Chinese ruler was regarded as the "Son of Heaven" but he was not surrounded by a magical aura as was the Pharaoh. The Egyptian ruler was actually conceived of as a god. He was not subject to removal by the people, while the Chinese Emperor could be dethroned if he failed to rule justly. It appears that the Chinese ruler was likely to be called upon to answer to the people for his actions, if not actually to the masses, then certainly to officials, while the Pharaoh was theoretically responsible only to the gods for his actions.

We have so far in our discussion pointed to the sharp dissimilarities between the thought in the Egyptian and Chinese societies, whose extent is at times extremely difficult to determine. There are also striking similarities between the societies. The most important of these is to be found in their world view. Both world views had wholeness. They viewed the world as a universal phenomenon represented in, or symbolized by, a universal being or principle; and both attested to a good life for all mankind, either on earth or in the celestial world.

The greatest difference between the Chinese and the Egyptian view of the world is found in the amount of physical knowledge each possessed. Egyptian thought evolved from a conception of the universe that was religiously dominated to a conception that was somewhat more naturalistic. The Chinese were not dominated by a religious philosophy of the universe during the period included in this study. They did not, therefore, have to make a transition from a religiously-dominated age to an age of philosophy. This hypothesis suggests that the Chinese developed before the Egyptians to a point where they substituted knowledge for erroneous belief. While both societies arrived at their understanding of nature through syllogistic operations, we find that the Chinese were perhaps better logicians than the Egyptians and made fewer errors in what they had to say about the world of man and the cosmos. Therefore, when we attribute a more critical world view to the Chinese it is not to imply that we believe the source of error is to be found in the Egyptian process of thought but rather in their lack of knowledge.

In their respective ways both Egyptian and Chinese thought became critical, but a real difference between them is found in the fact that they started from different premises and progressed to different ends. Although the Chinese and Egyptians began with distinct thought patterns centuries old, they may again be considered alike to the extent that each had a particular religious bent. Religion appeared in both societies as a synthesis of the thinking of the respective societies. It gave the people of each a universal value to which to cling. The human desire for satisfaction permeated both societies to the extent that there was thought to exist an absolute law or a lawgiver that contributed to the prosperity of men on earth.

We have seen that the Egyptians in the second cycle were rather sophisticated in their thinking. Frankfort's observation that Amon was the breath of life surely indicates this fact. When we reach the stage of Ikhnaton, in which there is a unification of deity, Egyptian thought is more sophisticated. The Egyptians viewed the unity in the human world as being representative of the unity to be found in the cosmos. The Chinese, in the third cycle, were synthesizing their various conceptions about the world and physical phenomena. This synthesis of Chinese thought associated with Chu Hsi and Wang Shou-jen points up the fact that the Chinese were making a very serious effort to understand their environment.

As a final note to our comparison, we must understand that in both societies when the powers of thought and action matured and man had more time to observe and consider his environment,

he became more aware of the differences between himself and the world about him. He began to wonder about the causes which lay behind the effects which he could observe. He accumulated a large store of beliefs about his environment and it was in these beliefs that he found the seeds of a central understanding of the universe and his place therein.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The literature concerning Egypt and China is rather extensive. Perhaps more attention has been devoted to the histories of these two countries than to those of any other of the ancient civilization. These areas seem to draw steadily for study persons intent on proving one thesis or another. It is regrettable, however, that we do not find adequate material on the development of thought for either ancient Egypt or China. Because the writings of early Chinese thinkers were edited by subsequent generations, an authentic understanding of Chinese history will have to wait until such time as scholars discover what is factual. Since most of our knowledge of Egyptian thought is based upon conclusions reached by various scholars in their study of material found in religious artifacts and records, we cannot regard this knowledge as unequivocal truth.

This comparative analysis of the development of thought in ancient Egypt and China is not written from original sources. In the case of Egypt it has been necessary to garner from ordinary histories or general works material that suggested obvious signs of change in thought. James Henry Breasted's The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt (New York, 1912) and his The Dawn of Conscience (New York, 1933) are necessary to understand the Ancient Egyptian's conceptions and beliefs and are excellent studies of the development of ethical standards in Egypt. Breasted's A History of Egypt (2nd ed.; New York, 1948) remains a standard historical treatment of the subject; his

Ancient Records (6 vols.; Chicago, 1906), especially, and Henri Frankfort's Ancient Egyptian Religion (New York, 1948) contain information which clearly suggests that Egyptian thought underwent a distinct process of development.

John A. Wilson's The Burden of Egypt (Chicago, 1951), excellent in parts, is an informative, impartial, and readable addition to the literature on Egypt. While very suggestive in respect to interpretation of the known history of Egypt, Wilson's book shares a major defect that is found usually in the books of Frankfort and others who believe that there was little advancement in thought until the Greeks. This belief suggests that the inhabitants of early civilized societies failed ever to approach the development of any form of scientific thinking.

Such a view may perhaps be traced back to Lévy-Brühl who describes primitive peoples as being pre-logical and prone to domination by mysticism (or religion), while the civilized peoples are dominated by logic. According to him, the primitives never advanced to the stage of recognition of the relationship between cause and effect in natural phenomena. Civilized man differed because he had the faculty to recount experiences; he, then, had the advantage of understanding the nature of cause and effect and of adjusting himself to his environment. Lëvy-Brühl builds his entire theory of the differences in the thinking of literates and pre-literates on this distinction.

In the writings of such prominent Egyptologists as Wilson and Frankfort we find a similar distinction being made between the peoples of earlier societies and those after the Greeks.

They would have us believe that thought in early societies remained virtually unchanged, and that the Greeks represent the starting point in the development of critical thought. One general criticism of this approach is that scholars fail to realize (or they virtually ignore the fact) that all people in the initial stages of civilization are mythopoeic to some extent.

Étienne Drioton and Jacques Vandier's Les peuples de l'orient Méditerranéen: I. L'Égypte (Paris, 1938) is by far the most important single volume on Egypt. It is a competent analysis of Egyptian institutions. Even judged on the basis of findings since 1938, it remains an authentic source.

Of importance is S. R. K. Glanville (ed.), The Legacy of Egypt (London, 1942); excellent essays on aspects of Egyptian civilization and Egypt's contributions to the ancient world and later times. Alexandre Moret's The Nile and Egyptian Civilization (New York, 1928), a standard work, proved most valuable for its merits as a comprehensive survey.

There is an abundance of material on the development of Chinese thought but most of it is void of critical approach. Fung Yu-lan's A History of Chinese Philosophy (Peiping, 1937) is not critical, but contains invaluable material on leading Chinese thinkers. A remarkable little book is Herrlee Glessner Creel's Sinism (Chicago, 1929), which gives a sound interpretation of Chinese thought in the Han period. Though Sinism is a very small book, written originally as a doctoral dissertation, it remains a good book for those interested in the movement of thought in the Han period. Creel's most serious error was in

attempting to project into earlier periods conclusions he found to be valid for the development of thought in the Han. Jan J. M. DeGroot's The Religion of the Chinese (New York, 1910) and John Knight Shryock's Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius (New York, 1932) are sound, well-written books. They do not deal with the general thought of the Chinese but they are necessary and useful to any discussion of Chinese thought. Perhaps the most important single volume, and, incidentally, the most recent, on Chinese thought available is a symposium edited by Arthur F. Wright called Studies in Chinese Thought (Chicago, 1953); it is a survey of the major aspects of Chinese thought with which Chinese philosophers have been concerned; an excellent source of information and suggestive interpretations.

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Ethics were consulted from 1930 and 1943 through the issues of 1954.

Many articles found in journals have been consulted but are not listed in this bibliography because their relevance to the subject is merely marginal.

Finally, there is one book to which I am greatly indebted for many ideas which have gone into this comparison. Francis MacDonald Cornford's From Religion to Philosophy, though mainly concerned with the origin of Western speculation, gave me the necessary mental construct to compare those changes from religion to philosophy which took place in both Egypt and China.

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